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V ietnam  as H isto ry : th e  A ustra lian  C ase
Jeffrey Grey
W ar has played a large part in the shaping of Australian society 
and national identity, but occupies a much less prominent part in the 
writing o f the nation’s history. And in contrast to the situation in the 
United States, where the flood o f published material o f all types 
threatens to overwhelm  the student o f the subject, Australian historical 
writing on the Vietnam  W ar is still in the early and tentative stages of 
developm ent.1 Equally, because Australia ’s involvement was smaller in 
relative terms than Am erica’s, and because that involvement did not 
pose such fundamental questions for Australians, there is less to be said 
about it.
Participation in the two world wars was followed by the 
commissioning o f large, multi-authored official histories which, for their 
time, were remarkably sophisticated and thorough. Indeed the history 
o f Australian efforts in the First World War, and more especially its editor 
and principal author C.E.W. Bean, has had a long-lasting influence 
upon the shape o f historical writing on war in this country.2 In contrast 
to the official histories elsewhere, written often to defend as well as 
explain the conduct o f the war. Bean’s history concerned itself with the 
extraordinary deeds of ordinary men, the soldiers themselves, and had 
less to say about strategy and virtually nothing on generalship, logistics 
or administration. The history written after the Second W orld War, 
edited by Gavin Long, took its cue from  Bean and again concentrated on 
a trench level view o f the fighting, although because o f the vastly greater 
mobilisation o f national resources involved between 1939-45 this series 
devoted much more attention to activities in the domestic economy and 
society.
In both world wars Australian correspondents were attached to 
the forces to report on their activities, and in both cases a decision was 
made to commission an official history before the conflict had ended. In 
the numerous smaller wars and warlike actions in which Australia found 
itself engaged after 1945— in Japan on occupation duty and in the 
Korean War, Malayan Emergency, Indonesian Confrontation and Vietnam 
— histories were commissioned long after the events they were to 
analyse, and the authors appointed had no first hand experience o f these 
conflicts. The history of the Korean W ar was completed only in 1985,3 
and an official historian for the postwar southeast Asian conflicts, o f 
which Vietnam is the centrepiece so to speak, was appointed only in 
1983. The restrictions o f the relevant archival legislation which, as in
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Britain, precludes public access to government records until they are 
thirty years old, together with the absence, as yet, o f any official history 
as was published for earlier conflicts, means that Australian writing on 
the Vietnam W ar lacks an authoritative official work which establishes 
the record and against which others may react or from which they may 
take a lead.
A  number of journalists in Australia wrote about Australian 
involvement during the Vietnam War, and of course there was a large and 
active anti-war publishing effort. By its nature little o f the latter has 
survived, while the former often belonged to a tradition o f Australian war 
writing which went back to Chester Wilmot and Kenneth Slessor in the 
Second World War, if not indeed to Bean himself— factual writing about 
the experiences and conditions o f the troops in the field of a kind 
common to war correspondents everywhere.4 After a new Australian 
government withdrew the last o f its forces in 1972, Vietnam disappeared 
quickly from the national agenda. With one or two exceptions it was not 
to receive serious attention again as a subject for nearly a decade.
The contemporary debate over Australian participation in the 
war continues to be reflected in most of the history written in the last 
decade. The universities were a focal point for anti-war activism at the 
height of the war, and some academics took a leading role in opposition 
"teach-ins" and street protests. Others, o f course, supported government 
policy, but they have been much more reticent subsequently. Indeed, it 
is almost impossible now to find anyone who defends seriously the stated 
aims for which Australia went to war in Vietnam.
In response to the fall o f Saigon in 1975, the Labor Prime 
Minister, E.G. (Gough) Whitlam, directed the Department of Foreign 
Affairs to prepare a paper on the Australian commitment, and this was 
tabled in the Parliament on 13 May.5 Much of the paper was taken up 
with an examination of the process by which Australian forces had been 
committed, with further attention given to the several increases in 
Australian troop strength undertaken between 1966-67. Arguing that 
“the decision in April 1965 to send a battalion for active service in South 
Vietnam was the crucial issue in Australia’s commitment”, the paper 
devoted most space to the events surrounding the “request” for direct 
military support from the South Vietnamese Government. In announcing 
the decision to send troops the then Prime Minister o f the Liberal 
Government, Sir Robert Menzies, had stated that his Government acted 
upon such a request, although it was never in fact produced. As it 
transpired, there had been no such request. Rather, the Government of 
Dr Phan Huy Quat had agreed to the despatch o f Australian troops after 
this had been arranged between the Australian and Am erican 
Governments and he himself had been pressured into acceptance. The 
Menzies Government saw a request as necessary in order that Australian 
action could be explained under the terms of the SEATO Treaty—which 
precluded action by member countries like Australia on the territory of
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protocol states such as South Vietnam except at the specific request of 
their governments— although in this instance SEATO was never actually 
invoked.
Critics then and subsequently were quick to seize on the issue of 
the “request”, and to use the circumstances under which it was 
produced as proof that the Australian Government acted contrary to the 
wishes o f the South Vietnamese and at the behest of the United States.6 
While there can be little doubt about the contrived nature of the request 
in 1965, this attitude ignored the fact that a succession o f South 
Vietnamese Government officials had called upon Australia for various 
forms o f non-specific military assistance in the years since 1961. A more 
complex interpretation o f the steps leading to Australian involvement 
has gradually appeared, and this emphasises both that Vietnam was not 
the central issue in Australian thinking at this time, and that the 
Australian Government acted with greater concern for Australian interests 
than earlier critics had allowed.
Australian defence and foreign policy has been characterised by 
a search for security lied to the guarantees o f a great and powerful friend. 
Until the fall o f Singapore this was provided by Britain, but the aftermath 
of the Second World W ar served to emphasise Britain’s failing imperial 
might, and while Australia never switched allegiance to the United States 
in the unthinking manner sometimes portrayed, increasingly in the 
1950s and early 1960s the Australian Government saw the preponderant 
Western role in southeast Asia as an American one. The ANZUS Treaty, 
signed in 1951, had provided non-specific assurances but in the 
changing strategic environment of the early 1960s this was felt to be 
insufficient should Australian interests be threatened directly. This 
threat was perceived as coming not from China, despite Menzies’ public 
statements about “the downward thrust o f Asian communism”, but from 
Indonesia.
Australia had viewed with concern the Indonesian incorporation 
of the former Dutch possession of West New Guinea in 1961, and 
Sukarno's policy o f “confrontation” with Malaysia, in which Australian 
troops were involved from 1964 by virtue o f existing defence ties with the 
British and Malaysian Governments, heightened alarm in Canberra. In 
a major study of Australian foreign policy at this time, historian Gregory 
Pemberton has shown the paramount importance of the relationship 
with Indonesia for any understanding of Australian Vietnam policy;7 
Australian efforts to ensure that the United States increased and 
maintained its commitment in southeast Asia were directed to containing 
Sukarno as much as they were to preventing the further expansion of 
com m unist power in Indochina. O ther w riters have taken the 
interpretation of this activist policy stance further, however, in arguing 
that the American Government would not have expanded its own 
involvement in Vietnam in 1965 but for the persistent and continuous 
badgering o f the Australian Government, which sought to provide the
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diplomatic preconditions which would make an Am erican combat 
commitment possible.8 O f course, it may be objected at once that this 
explanatory tail wags the historical dog, and that such a view  ignores 
entirely the numerous domestic pressures within the United States itself 
which led President Johnson to increase substantially the American 
combat presence. Perhaps the most interesting thing about this 
argument is that it flies in the face o f a tradition o f Australian historical 
writing, especially on the left, which sees Australian foreign policy as 
reactive and entirely at the disposal o f one or other great power.
In the context o f the war as a whole, the actual Australian 
commitment was of marginal significance. A t its height, the Australian 
Task Force in Phuoc Tuy province numbered 8300 men. Approxim ately 
50.000 served in total, o f whom 500 were killed and over 2000 wounded.9 
Against the peak troop presence of the Koreans (50,000) or Thais 
(11,500), much less the ARVN or the US, it was a tiny effort. But there 
are other ways o f assessing the Australian military contribution. Not 
only were Australians the first o f the Free W orld Military Assistance 
Forces to jo in  the US in the field, but unlike the Koreans and Thais, they 
and the New Zealanders bore the costs o f the deployment themselves. As 
a force from a stable western liberal democracy in Asia their presence 
lent credibility to Johnson’s call for “more flags” in Vietnam, while their 
undoubted military effectiveness reinforced further the value of the 
contribution.10
Australia’s military effort has been looked at from two perspectives: 
in terms o f the combat experience and, less frequently, from  a strategic 
and institutional viewpoint. Personal experience is a strong suit in 
Australian military writing, the tradition descending in an unbroken line 
from Dr Bean and the First World War, and the bulk o f the work in this 
category has recounted the war from a unit or individual perspective. A  
number o f army units produced illustrated accounts of their tours of 
duty, but only one was published commercially.11 The passage o f time 
has neutralised most o f the controversy generated by an unpopular war, 
and Vietnam  is now being incorporated into the mainstream o f the 
Australian m ilitary tradition in a number o f accounts.12 This attitude is 
reflected in some, although by no means all, o f the memoirs and personal 
recollections. Those written by regulars have tended to dwell on the 
positive features o f m ilitary service and have reserved criticism  for the 
perceived lack o f support for their efforts in Australia.13 Other accounts 
are much more critical o f the army itself, or are bitter at the ingratitude 
o f the civilian population back home, an attitude which many national 
servicemen [conscripts] first encountered only after their return from 
active service.14 The sense of hostility and even despair which these 
accounts portray is much more resonant within the small num ber of 
combat novels written by Australian authors, although most o f the latter 
were not written by combat veterans.15
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There are a number of more sophisticated treatments of Australia’s 
operational involvement, at both the unit and higher levels. The first 
Australian combat troops were committed in 1962 as part o f a training 
and advisory mission which later worked through the US Special Forces 
network and. later still, had some part in the Phoenix programme. This 
unit’s diverse and difficult tasks have been treated at great length,16 in 
a manner which combines successfully the emphasis on individual 
experience which is so important in the Australian military tradition 
with some pertinent analysis of the policy which governed the Training 
Team ’s deployment. The first Australian battalion to see action in 1965- 
1966, as part o f the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in BienHoa province, has 
also been treated at length.17 The circumstances o f this unit’s 
deployment, and the undoubted difficulties which ensued from attaching 
the battalion to a larger force which operated on different doctrinal and 
administrative assumptions, allows the author to contrast unfavourably 
American tactical shortcomings with Australian professionalism, thus 
reinforcing one o f the central tenets o f the Australian military myth. The 
same process is at work in the official account of the Special Air Service 
Regiment, a book which fulfills the additional function o f demonstrating, 
at least to the author’s satisfaction, the continuing utility o f special 
forces in the Australian army.18
A  wider perspective is rare, and there has been almost no 
institutional or systemic analysis of the army in this period. The army 
went to Vietnam immediately following a period o f considerable 
organisational upheaval resulting from the adoption and then 
abandonment o f the Peniropic division,19 and with a command and 
control system which, at least initially, was not as well suited to the 
political-military demands placed upon it as arguably it needed to be.20 
There is only one analysis of the Australian Task Force’s operations 
overall in Vietnam between 1966-72, and this is at times highly critical 
o f the perceived absence of “a coherent and effective military role on the 
ground”.21 The author’s overall contention that because the war in 
Vietnam was lost Australia’s role in Phuoc Tuy province was a failure 
implies a misunderstanding of the relationship between the operational 
and strategic levels of war, but other criticisms concerning, for example, 
the construction of the Dat Do-Phuoc Hai minefield or the failure of the 
Australians to take over the province advisory role from the Americans 
are well sustained. The tone overall is too critical, but the absence to date 
of a countervailing view is striking.22
The sociology of the forces at this time is likewise a neglected 
field, although it should be added that this is true for all o f Australia’s 
wars. The difference, however, is that only in this war were conscripts 
sent on active service outside Australian territory,23 and it is the 
conscript element o f the army, about one-third only of those who served 
in Vietnam, which has attracted scholarly attention, most notably in the 
work of Jane Ross.24 The specific weakness of this work is that it
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relegates the regular army majority to the peripheries, while the absence 
o f any w ider study o f the national service scheme as a whole robs it of 
necessary context and comparison.
Conscription itself was reintroduced in April 1964, before any 
decision had been made about deploying combat units to Vietnam and 
in the context again o f fears about an intensified Indonesian insurgency 
in Borneo. Indeed, it is not widely known that both the army and the 
Department of Labour and National Service opposed the reintroduction 
of the scheme, citing the experience in the 1950s when national 
servicemen had been required to perform only six months compulsory 
training and had had no overseas service obligation. The deployment of 
conscripts on active service in Vietnam, beginning in m id-1966, sparked 
growing opposition within Australia at a level not seen since the bitterly 
fought conscription referenda during the First World War. Curiously, 
this aspect of Australia’s Vietnam W ar has been least frequently and 
least satisfactorily dealt w ith in the h istorical literature.25 The 
Moratorium movement, as anti-conscription, anti-war activism came to 
be called, still awaits its historian, although the documentary legacy of 
the various oppositional groupings is rich and varied and a number of 
postgraduate theses have been written on aspects of the subject. 
Published work remains thin. Much of it is written by former activists 
and has a defensive tone, while other authors are at pains to demonstrate 
a tradition o f anti-war dissent and the existence o f a peace movement 
throughout our history, as if this somehow validates the movement in 
the 1960s.26 There are important legal, constitutional, political and 
moral issues involved in the imposition of national service for Vietnam, 
but only a handful o f writers seem concerned to follow them through.27
Overviews o f the Australian war have been few, and generally 
mixed in quality. The earliest contribution in this area, a series o f essays 
published in the early 1980s,28 suffered from the usual problems of 
edited works and provided an uneasy m ix of academic work with 
personal recollection. A  similar effort produced at the end o f the decade 
suffered from many o f the same faults.29 Both books bring together a 
variety o f perspectives critical o f Australian involvement, but the quality 
o f the scholarship is uneven and the strident authorial voice employed 
sits ill with attempts to provide a detached— which is not to say 
disengaged— perspective on events which occurred before a sizeable 
section o f the Australian population was bom .
The legacy of the Vietnam War, in Australia as in the United 
States, is demonstrated most clearly by the large influx o f Indochinese 
migrants and refugees since 1975, and by the continuing fight for 
recognition by Vietnam veterans. Asian immigration has long been a 
political issue in Australia, a nation which until the 1960s excluded non­
white m igrants through the provisions of the Immigration Act in the 
interests o f a white Australia policy. Despite the best attempts o f the 
racist fringe, and the occasional unwise sally by more establishment
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figures, Australian society has absorbed Indochinese migrants, as it has 
the earlier waves o f European and Middle Eastern migrants who have 
arrived since the Second World War, without significant social upheaval.30 
The problems of Vietnam veterans are both more public and more vexed. 
The Vietnam Veterans Association o f Australia was formed in 1980 as a 
result o f dissatisfaction with existing veterans’ groups, principally the 
Returned Services League, and with the bureaucracy o f the Department 
of Veterans’ Affairs. It represents no more than 5,000 members, about 
one-tenth o f those eligible, but has played a prominent role as a ginger 
group in veterans’ politics, especially overthe cluster of issues surrounding 
Agent Orange and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, which is claimed by 
some to be more prevalent in this group o f veterans than in any other.31 
As in the United States, there is a clear perception that this generation 
has not been accorded the recognition and level o f public esteem enjoyed, 
in particular, by soldiers of the Second World War. In the Australian case 
at least this is to assume that the latter was typical o f the public response 
to returning service personnel throughout the twentieth century, a 
proposition which must be qualified fairly heavily. In the United States, 
the historiographical battle lines in most cases match those drawn 
politically during the war; the arguments of the 1980s in many cases 
have not advanced much beyond those of the 1960s. In Australia, on the 
other hand, the moral argument to some extent has shifted from the 
political arena of the 1960s and 1970s to the field ofvelerans’ entitlements 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Whatever advance it may represent otherwise, 
it has not helped in the clear analysis o f veterans’ issues.
As the archives begin to open in the next decade we can expect 
an increase in the number of works dealing with Australian participation 
in the war, and can hope for an improvement in the scholarly and 
evidential base of research in some o f the areas noted above. Given the 
lines along which the writing of Australian military history has developed 
in the 75 years since the First World War, it is by no means obvious that 
this will result in a broadening o f the focus o f the work which results. 1
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